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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of increasing formality via tax reduction and sim-
plification schemes on micro-firm performance. It uses the 1997 Brazilian SIMPLES
program. We develop a simple theoretical model to show that SIMPLES has an impact
only on a segment of the micro-firm population, for which the effect of formality on
firm performance can be identified, and that can be analyzed along the single dimen-
sional quantiles of the conditional firm revenues. To estimate the effect of formality, we
use an econometric approach that compares eligible and non-eligible firms, born before
and after SIMPLES in a local interval about the introduction of SIMPLES. We use
an estimator that combines both quantile regression and the regression discontinuity
identification strategy. The empirical results corroborate the positive effect of formality
on microfirms’ performance and produce a clear characterization of who benefits from
these programs.
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“Lo que pasa es que aca´ si vos queres abrir un negocio te matan a papeles, y despue´s te controlan,
y los impuestos te revientan.” [What happens here is that when you try to open a business
they kill you on paperwork (red tape), then they control you, and taxes are unbearable.]
Mart´ın Caparro´s, El Interior, a book on interviews and anecdotes from the poor countryside
in Argentina.
1 Introduction
The very high costs of complying with government regulations and institutions have of-
ten been seen as largely responsible for the presence of large informal sectors in developing
countries. Formality is broadly defined as as participation in societal and governmental in-
stitutions, such as paying taxes, being registered with the authorities, etc. (see Gerxhani,
2004; Maloney, 2004, for a survey). Firms’ inability to become formal is thought to have
deleterious effects on performance. As examples, formality offers the firm access to risk
pooling mechanisms that may attract more educated paid workers and engage them in a
longer relationship with the firm, which in turn makes training and capital goods acquisi-
tion more profitable. Formality may be a requirement for access to formal credit markets
or Government provided business development services or, as Paula and Scheinkman (2007)
have argued, for subcontracting relations with formal firms. Moreover, to the extent that
formality increases the ability of micro-entrepreneurs to establish property rights over their
investments and reduces the risk of being fined by Government inspectors, it creates incen-
tives for operating out of fixed locations rather than in an ambulatory fashion (see de Soto,
1989). The perceived onerous cost of formality was tackled by several Latin American gov-
ernments by introducing tax reductions and simplifications. Examples of such programs are
the Monotributo1 in Argentina, SARE2 in Mexico, and the SIMPLES3 in Brazil. Available
1Re´gimen Simplificado para Pequen˜os Contribuyentes, see Gonza´lez (2006).
2SARE stands for “Sistema de Apertura Ra´pida de Empresas.” It was implemented in selected munic-
ipalities and consolidated in single local offices all the federal, state and municipal procedures needed to
register a firm, reducing the total duration of the process to at most 48 hours.
3SIMPLES stands for “Sistema Integrado de Pagamento de Impostos e Contribuc¸o˜es as Microempresas
e Empresas de Pequeno Porte”. See Section 3 for a detailed description of the program.
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evidence shows that these programs had a positive effect on formality. See Kaplan, Piedra,
and Seira (2006) for SARE; and Monteiro and Assunc¸ao (2006) and Fajnzylber, Maloney,
and Montes-Rojas (2010) for SIMPLES.
This paper studies the effects of increasing formality via tax reduction and simplification
on micro-firm performance. We contribute to the literature by answering two questions:
First, which firms benefit from tax reduction and simplification schemes? Second, is there
heterogeneity on the effect of formality on firm performance? These questions have very
important policy implications. In a Ricardian setting, tax reductions imply a redistribution
of wealth, and therefore, it is important to quantify which firms are really benefiting from
these programs. In particular, if tax reductions only benefit already well-off formal firms,
then the program did not accomplished the task of broadening the scope of formality. In
order to answer these questions, we focus on very small firms or micro-firms, defined as
own-account workers and firms with less than five paid employees. This sector comprise the
majority of employment in developing countries. Within the micro-firms sector three groups
can be distinguished. First, well-off micro-entrepreneurs (i.e. owners of micro-firms) with
substantial growth prospects may have self-selected into formality with the old (high) tax
system, as the perceived benefits of being formal offset the cost of formality. Then, this
segment benefits only from the tax reduction. Second, some micro-entrepreneurs are in the
informal sector only temporarily waiting for a formal job vacancy, as predicted in the Harris
and Todaro (1970) dual labor market hypothesis (see Maloney, 1999, 2004; Mandelman and
Montes-Rojas, 2009, for a discussion). Therefore, they will not value future gains from
becoming formal and tax reductions will not affect them. Third, in between those segments
there are micro-firms that may become formal only when the cost of formality is low enough.
These micro-firms receive the gains from being formal but have to pay taxes as a result. We
call this segment the target group. These are the firms that should benefit from the tax
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reduction programs, and change their formality status.
In order to contribute to a better understanding of the effects of a tax reduction on
the micro-entrepreneur sector, we begin by developing a theoretical model. We motivate
our analysis in the context of a one-period model drawn from Rauch (1991) and Paula and
Scheinkman (2007) with emphasis on the effect of a reduction in taxes. The model implies
that SIMPLES has an impact only on a segment of the micro-firm population. This result is
generated from an equilibrium with segmentation characterized by salaried workers, informal
and formal micro-entrepreneurs.
Empirically, our goal is to quantify both the size of the target group (i.e. which firms
benefit from the tax reduction) and the impact of formality on micro-firm’s revenues. The
identification strategy makes use of the SIMPLES program in Brazil, that offers an exogenous
change in legislation that can be used to control for self-selection and endogeneity. Monteiro
and Assunc¸ao (2006) exploit the SIMPLES program applying a difference-in-differences ap-
proach with ineligible firms as a control group. They study the effect of SIMPLES on having
a government issued license, which constitutes a necessary requirement for further formal-
ization (such as pay taxes or social security), and they find an increase in formal licensing
among retail firms of 13 percentage points, but no effect on eligible firms from other sectors
(construction, manufacturing, transportation and other services). Moreover, using SIMPLES
eligibility as an instrumental variable for formality, they show that the latter significantly
increases access to credit, and alters the amount and composition of investment towards
larger and longer-term projects. Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2010) show that
SIMPLES has only a local effect at the time of its introduction. They consider firms born
just before and after November 1996. Using a regression discontinuity design (see Hahn,
Todd, and van der Klaauw, 2001; van der Klaauw, 2002, for a discussion about regression
discontinuity estimators), with weights given by the age of the firm (time-in-business) and
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its distance to the introduction of SIMPLES, they find a significant effect on licensing, tax
registration, tax payments and social security contributions. However, when more firms
were taken into consideration, these effects’ statistical significance decreases monotonically
with the sample average time distance to the introduction of SIMPLES. We build on their
analyses extending it to a quantile regression discontinuity analysis.
In order to identify the objects of interest, we make use of the heterogeneity in the con-
ditional distribution of revenue applying quantile regression techniques, which will prove
an indispensable tool for the problem in question. To proceed with estimation and testing
we employ a quantile regression discontinuity estimator. Quantile regression methods offer
a systematic method to analyze differences in covariates effects (see Koenker and Hallock,
2001; Koenker, 2005), provide a framework for robust estimation and inference, and most
importantly allow exploring a range of conditional quantiles exposing conditional hetero-
geneity under weak distributional assumptions. For the present problem, the micro-firm
heterogeneity can be analyzed along the single dimensional conditional quantiles of the firm
revenues. Along this dimension, high quantiles correspond to best entrepreneurs and low
quantiles to worst entrepreneurs. Chesher (2005) studies identification under discrete vari-
ation and shows that the identifying intervals can be estimated using quantile regression
methods. An important result is that the support of exogenous covariates may limit the
values of endogenous ones and the quantiles at which interval identification can be obtained.
The combination of weak instruments and sparse support can produce underidentification at
some or all values of the exogenous variable and quantile. Thus, as argued in Chesher (2005),
the identification through quantile regression strategy may work for some quantiles (in our
case target entrepreneurs) but not for others (in our case the worst and best entrepreneurs).
In other words, Chesher (2003) argued about “the possibility of identification of a structural
derivative evaluated at some quantile probabilities but not at others”(p.1411).
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Our proposed identification and estimation strategy combines the regression discontinu-
ity approach and the quantile regression framework. Frolich and Melly (2008) propose a
nonparametric identification of the quantile treatment effects in the regression discontinu-
ity design and they propose an uniformly consistent estimator for the potential outcome
distributions and for the function-valued effects of the policy. Frandsen (2008) introduces
a procedure to nonparametrically estimate local quantile treatment effects in a regression
discontinuity design with binary treatment. However, the literature on analyzing the effects
of formality on firm decision relies heavily on parametric estimators. In this paper, we use a
semiparametric estimator to analyze the posed questions. In particular, we employ a linear
instrumental variables (IV) quantile regression (QR) estimator proposed by Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2006, 2008) applied to estimate a fuzzy regression discontinuity design model.
The model is semiparametric in the sense that the functional form of the conditional distri-
bution of the response variable given the regressors is left unspecified. The use of QR-IV in
regression discontinuity design has appeared in Guiteras (2008) motivated by an empirical
application to the returns to compulsory schooling, and Pereda-Fernandez (2010) estimating
the effects of class size on scholastic achievement.
The econometric results are summarized as follows. First, for comparison reasons, we
present results for both IVOLS and IVQR estimates of the conditional mean and quantiles
of firm revenues for the selected weighting scheme for all micro-entrepreneurs and for those
that started as owners. The results show positive point estimates for both IVOLS and IVQR,
along the quantiles, evidencing that formality has a positive effect on revenues. However, the
point estimate are rather imprecise. These high and rather imprecise estimates are similar to
those in Monteiro and Assunc¸ao (2006) and Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2010).
Secondly, the central empirical results of the paper concern the IVQR estimates and confirm
that there is strong heterogeneity on the impact of license on the conditional distribution
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of revenues, answering the second posed question. This is an important finding because
it formalizes the intuition that the impact of the tax simplification schemes affect firms
in a different manner. In addition, the answer for the first question, which firms benefit
from the tax reduction and simplification, is given by the estimates from the empirical
exercise showing that the target population is given by τ quantiles in 0.10 ≤ τ ≤ 0.50 or
0.10 ≤ τ ≤ 0.60 depending on the sample. This means that SIMPLES have a potential
effect on 40% to 50% of the micro-entrepreneur population. We observe that the effect
of licensing is positive and large, though decreasing on τ for this range. These estimates
suggest that reducing the cost of formality might significantly benefit informal firms and
not necessarily the conditionally best ones. Finally, from the study of the covariates effects,
there is evidence that women engage in less profitable activities, possibly due to household
commitments or outright gender discrimination. Moreover, interestingly, education is non-
monotonic for the conditional mean model and for low quantiles. In those cases, incomplete
secondary education has the highest effect in both subsamples. However, education becomes
monotonically increasing for τ ≥ 0.5. This determines that for firms in the low conditional
quantiles, higher education is not necessarily associated with higher revenues, but it is with
outstanding firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model. Section
3 describes the SIMPLES program and the identification strategy. Section 4 develops the
quantile regression discontinuity estimator. Section 5 describes the ECINF micro-firm survey.
Section 6 presents the econometric results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Taxes and the informal sector
In this section, we present a simple model that generates an equilibrium with segmentation
characterized by salaried workers, informal and formal micro-entrepreneurs. Accordingly, in
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the next section, we will show empirically that SIMPLES has an impact only on a segment
of the micro-firm population, for which the effect of formality on firm performance can be
identified, and that can be analyzed along the single dimensional quantiles of the conditional
firm revenues.
We model a economy where agents decide whether to work as salaried workers or to
become (micro-)entrepreneurs, and we describe an equilibrium where only a fraction of agents
become entrepreneurs and salaried workers are paid a subsistence salary. The model shows
that an individual becomes an informal entrepreneur, rather than being a salaried worker, if
her individual ability is higher than a certain threshold and becomes a formal entrepreneur,
rather than being an informal one, if her individual ability is higher than an even higher
threshold. The higher is the cost of formality the higher is the threshold value of ability to
become a formal entrepreneur. This simple model builds on the models of Rauch (1991) and
Paula and Scheinkman (2007).
We consider a continuum of agents, each denoted by i and characterized by entrepreneurial
ability θi, which is distributed according to a probability density function g(·). Agents choose
between working for an existing firm and earning a subsistence level of wealth s independent
from their ability thus becoming a salaried worker, operating a firm in the informal sector or
operating a firm in the formal sector. The last two options correspond to the entrepreneurial
sector. An entrepreneur produces quantity yi of an homogeneous good using capital ki and
labor li as inputs. In order to maintain tractability we consider a Cobb-Douglas technology
yi = θik
α
i l
β
i , with α, β > 0 and α + β < 1.
4
We normalize the price of the homogenous good to 1. The unit costs of k and l are
respectively r and w, where w is the equilibrium wage earned by salaried workers. We
assume that the cost of capital is determined outside the described small economy. We
4The results of the model would still apply with any concave production function.
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will describe an equilibrium where each salaried worker earns a wage which is equal to the
subsistence level of wealth (w = s). For exposition purposes, we start by describing the
optimal choices of the entrepreneurs given r and w.
We distinguish between formal and informal entrepreneurs. A formal entrepreneur pays
an ad valorem tax φ. An informal entrepreneur cheats the system and pays no taxes, but
if detected is out of business. We assume that the probability of detection p increases with
the size of the firm and that p(k) = 0 if k ≤ k∗ and p(k) = 1 if k > k∗, that is, an informal
entrepreneur cannot employ more than k∗ but is able to evade taxes.5
The profit functions for an entrepreneur of ability θi who chooses to be respectively
informal or formal follow:
piIi = max
li,ki≤k∗
{θikαi lβi − rki − wli}, (1)
piFi = max
li,ki
{(1− φ)θikαi lβi − rki − wli}.
The maximization of (1) gives the optimal quantity of production factors which are
respectively used by an informal and a formal entrepreneur, given her ability θi:
kIi = min{θ
1
1−α−β
i (
α
r
)
1−β
1−α−β (
β
w
)
β
1−α−β , k∗}, (2)
lIi = min{θ
1
1−α−β
i (
α
r
)
α
1−α−β (
β
w
)
1−α
1−α−β , (
βθik∗α
w
)
1
1−β },
kFi = ((1− φ)θi)
1
1−α−β (
α
r
)
1−β
1−α−β (
β
w
)
β
1−α−β , (3)
lFi = ((1− φ)θi)
1
1−α−β (
α
r
)
α
1−α−β (
β
w
)
1−α
1−α−β .
When is it optimal for an entrepreneur to become formal? If irrespective of the tax φ
an entrepreneur finds optimal to employ less than k∗, then she has no advantage to become
5The functional form of the probability of detection could be more general: Paula and Scheinkman
(2007) show that as long as p is an increasing function of k there is still a threshold level of ability such that
entrepreneurs go from informal to formal and therefore the same conclusions hold.
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formal. We can illustrate this result formally. Using the first order conditions we define θ∗
as that ability such that an informal entrepreneur finds optimal to choose k∗,
θ∗ ≡ k∗1−α−β
( r
α
)1−β (w
β
)β
, (4)
hence kI(θ∗) = θ∗
1
1−α−β (α
r
)
1−β
1−α−β ( β
w
)
β
1−α−β and lI(θ∗) = θ∗
1
1−α−β (α
r
)
α
1−α−β ( β
w
)
1−α
1−α−β . It is imme-
diate to verify that if θi ≥ θ∗ then piI(θ∗) > piF (θ∗). Therefore every entrepreneur with ability
smaller than θ∗ will find optimal to stay informal. It will be clear that this segment repre-
sents the involuntary entrepreneurs which we mentioned in the introduction. Entrepreneurs
with ability greater than θ∗ would always find optimal to employ more than k∗ if this did
not imply to pay the tax φ. In choosing whether to become formal or not such entrepreneurs
trade off the gains of employing more than k∗ with the cost of paying the tax φ. As shown
by Paula and Scheinkman (2007), the convexity of the profit functions (1) in θ implies that
there is a unique threshold level of ability above which entrepreneurs become formal. We
can establish this result formally and find an analytical expression for the threshold level of
ability.
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold level of ability θ¯ such that an entrepreneur i will
decide to be formal if and only if her ability θi is greater than θ¯. θ¯ increases in φ.
Proof in the Appendix.
Labor market equilibrium
We describe a labor market equilibrium where each worker is paid the same subsistence wage
rate w = s.6 We define an ability threshold θˆ such the individual with ability θˆ is indifferent
6One reason for this could be that the ability is only relevant when managing a firm. The focus of this
paper is not on the possible wage differences across workers.
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between becoming a salaried worker or an informal entrepreneur, hence w = piI(θˆ). Plugging
the first order conditions (2) into (1) we find that
θˆ = (1− α− β)(α+β−1)(r/α)α(1/β)βw1−α. (5)
For w to be the equilibrium wage it must be the case that, given w, labor demand equals
labor supply. In order to compute the labor demand we add the demand from informal
and formal entrepreneurs. Informal entrepreneurs are either involuntary (if their ability is
smaller than θ∗) or voluntary (if their ability is between θ∗ and θˆ).
Labor demand:
D(w) = (
α
r
)
α
1−α−β (
β
w
)
1−α
1−α−β
∫ θ∗
θˆ
θ
1
1−α−β dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
involuntary
+
∫ θ¯
θ∗
(
βθk∗α
w
)
1
1−β dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
voluntary informal
+
(
α
r
)
α
1−α−β (
β
w
)
1−α
1−α−β
∫ θmax
θ¯
((1− φ)θ) 11−α−β dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
formal
.
Labor supply: G(θˆ), where G(·) is the cumulative distribution function given g(·).
Notice that labor demand decreases in w, while supply increases in w as θˆ increases
in w. A unique equilibrium exists by the unique crossing of supply and demand.7 We are
describing an equilibrium with both formal and informal entrepreneurs, hence an equilibrium
where θˆ < θ∗. Using (4) and (5) we find that this is the case if the equilibrium wage
w < (1− α− β)k∗(r/α).
We focus on such equilibrium and therefore we have that:
if θi ≤ θˆ, then i is a salaried worker,
7See Rauch (1991) for a formal proof.
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if θi ∈ (θˆ, θ¯], then i is an informal entrepreneur,
if θi > θ¯, then i is a formal entrepreneur.
Effect of a policy change
If the salaried wage is fixed, the fact that θ¯ increases in φ (proposition 1) implies the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 The greater the tax φ, the greater the cut-off level of ability θ¯ and the smaller
the formal sector (and viceversa).
We describe a situation where the change in wage is negligible, or a situation where there
is excess labor supply both before and after the change in the tax. In both those situations
the corollary is valid.8
It is interesting to note that, those who gain the most out of a reduction in the cost of
formalization from φ to φ′ are the more able individuals. As we will remark, this result is
due to the convexity of the technology.
Proposition 2 The greater the individual ability θi is the greater is the increase in the profit
pi(θi) for a decrease in the tax rate from φ to φ
′.
Proof in the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the informal entrepreneurs’ profit function (thick line) and the formal
entrepreneurs’ profit function before and after a reduction in the tax (respectively thin and
8As the tax rate φ changes, the equilibrium wage may in principle change. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in
the tax fosters a larger formal sector, but this effect increases in turn the demand for labor. We abstract
from the possibility of a change in the equilibrium wage. One reason is that the change in the equilibrium
wage may be of second order importance. Another reason is that if, given s, there is excess labor supply
both before and after the change in the tax, then workers will still be payed the subsistence wage.
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dash line). From the figure it is possible to notice the results of propositions 1 and 2. 9 From
the figure, it is also evident that the result of proposition 2 would not apply to a different
model in which piF (φ′) is not always convex for θ > θ¯′.10
The model can also be extended to the case of lump-sum tax, namely a case where the
profit function of a formal entrepreneur is the following: piFi = max
li,ki
{θikαi lβi − rki −wli − φ},
where φ now represents a lump-sum tax. In such case all the previous conclusions still hold.
Figure 2 illustrates the profit functions’ plots for such case of lump-sum tax. 11
3 The SIMPLES program and identification strategy
In November 1996, the Brazilian Government implemented a new unanticipated simplified
tax system for micro and small firms, the SIMPLES. The new national system consolidated
several federal taxes and social security contributions. Basically, the SIMPLES abridged
procedures for the verification and payment of federal, state and municipal taxes. At the
Federal level, the system allowed eligible firms to combine six different types of federal taxes
and five different social security contributions into a one single monthly payment, varying
from 3% to 5% of gross revenues for micro-enterprises, and from 5.4% to 7% of revenues
for small firms. As a result, SIMPLES permitted an overall reduction of up to 8% in the
tax burden faced by eligible firms (Monteiro and Assunc¸ao, 2006). Moreover, while value
added taxes collected at the state and municipal levels - the Imposto Sobre Circulac¸a˜o de
Mercadorias e Prestac¸a˜o de Servic¸os (ICMS) and the Imposto Sobre Servic¸os (ISS) - were
9Profit functions for given values α = 0.2, β = 0.7, r = 30, w = 50. Then, it can be computed that
k∗ = 0.3123 ∗ 10−9 and θ∗ = 10. The figure shows the informal entrepreneurs’ profit (thick line) and of
formal given φ = 0.2 (thin line) and given φ = 0.1 (dash line). It can be computed that the threshold value
of ability is θ¯ = 16.1 for φ = 0.2 and decreases to θ¯ = 13.2 for φ = 0.1.
10These would be the case with the non-convexities described in McKenzie and Woodruff (2006), where
the return to capital is higher for low-capital firms.
11Given values α = 0.2, β = 0.7, r = 3, w = 5, k∗ = 3.123, it can be computed that θ∗ = 10. The figure
shows a plot of the informal entrepreneurs’ profit (thick line) and of formal given φ = 500 (thin line) and
given φ = 250 (dash line). It can be computed that the threshold value of ability is θ¯ = 16 for φ = 500 and
decreases to θ¯ = 14.5 for φ = 250.
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initially not included in SIMPLES, States and Municipalities could enter into agreements
with the Federal Government to transfer to the latter the collection of the corresponding
taxes through an increase in the SIMPLES rates.
The motivation behind the these reductions in direct and indirect taxes achieved through
SIMPLES was to enable small, unskilled labor-intensive firms to compete more effectively
with larger enterprises, for which high tax burdens are more manageable due to scale
economies. SIMPLES, however, explicitly excluded from program eligibility all activities
that by law require the employment of professionals in regulated occupations. Examples of
ineligible activities include the manufacturing of chemical products, machinery and equip-
ment, as well education, health, accounting, insurance and financial services, among others.
Given the previous model, firms’ output or revenues yi = θik
α
i l
β
i can be re-expressed as
a function of formality (which can be thought as an indicator variable with 0 and 1 and
labeled with d), and entrepreneurial ability θi:
yi = f(di, θi).
As the previous section showed formality affects output through the quantity of capital as
formal entrepreneurs can employ a quantity ki > k
∗. Net of the effect of costs of formality φ,
an entrepreneur i would employ ki > k
∗ if and only if θi > θ∗. Therefore f(1, θi)− f(0, θi) >
0, θi > θ
∗ (return to formality) and ∂f(.,.)
∂θi
= kαi l
β
i > 0 (return to ability). We use revenues
as our dependent or outcome variable in order to avoid the endogeneity of capital and labor
(i.e. both are correlated with ability), and to avoid measurement errors in the cost of capital,
which are potentially large in micro-firms surveys. Therefore, the return to formality is the
ultimate effect on revenues arising from hiring both more labor and capital. However, this
may also include changes in the composition of clients as in Paula and Scheinkman (2007).
As we have shown, there exists a cut-off value of ability, θ¯, and firms with ability above
that threshold will select into formality. SIMPLES can be conceived of as a reduction in
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the cost of formalization to φ′ < φ – albeit across many margins: registration costs, labor
costs etc. – that will change the cut-off value of ability from θ¯ to θ¯′ (Corollary 1). Firms
that change their formality status because of SIMPLES are those with θ ∈ (θ¯′, θ¯]. This also
implies that there will be a subset of firms who will not change their formality status: some
will remain formal (best entrepreneurs), others will remain informal (worst entrepreneurs).
Consider now a cross-sectional linear regression model for a firm revenue variable y,
yi = β1di + β2ti + β3xi + θi, (6)
where i denotes the firm, d is a binary formality indicator, t denotes time-in-business, x is a
set of exogenous covariates and θ is a firm-specific unobserved component. The main issue
in measuring the effect of formality literature is that di is correlated with θi, therefore OLS
estimates of β1 will be biased.
The introduction of SIMPLES by unanticipated administrative decree can be seen as an
exogenous policy change that significantly altered the incentives to become formal and hence
is useful in avoiding the possible biases arising from self-selection. The theoretical model
developed above predicts that only for a segment of firms we will be able to measure the
effect of formality. The reason is that we will only observe a significant effect of SIMPLES
on those firms with θ ∈ (θ¯′, θ¯]. This is the group of firms that have a large enough θ such
that the SIMPLES tax reduction makes them to re-evaluate their formality status, but not
so large as to make the change in φ irrelevant to their formality decision. This segment
contains firms that will become formal only after the reduction in taxes, and therefore we
can identify β1 by using the regression discontinuity approach described above. Note that
this does not mean that for firms with θ < θ¯′ or θ¯ < θ formality has no effect on the firm
performance variable. It is only that using this procedure we cannot identify it using the
exogenous change in taxes does not produce a change in the formality status of the firms.
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In other words, we can only identify the effect of formality for those firms that did change
their status due to SIMPLES.
Let AFTER be an indicator for whether a firm was created before or after the SIMPLES
was implemented (such that AFTERi = 1 if ti ≤ t¯ and AFTERi = 0 otherwise, where firms
that have been in business for at most t¯ months were created after SIMPLES) and ELIG
an indicator for the eligibility status of the firm. Monteiro and Assunc¸ao (2006) use the
interaction of eligible/non-eligible and before/after indicators (i.e. AFTER × ELIG) as
an instrumental variable (IV) to measure the impact of formality on investment and credit
access, with the first stage regression being as follows:
di = α1AFTERi + α2ELIGi + α3(AFTERi × ELIGi) + α4xi + ei, (7)
Figure 3 plots licensing rates for firms with different time-in-business. The latter is
measured as the time distance in months to the introduction of the SIMPLES in November
1996 (eg. 0 corresponds to October 1996, -1 to November 1996, 1 to September 1996). The
first two graphs plot separately eligibles and non-eligibles for all firms; the last two takes
only the sample of entrepreneurs that started as owners of the firm. The figures show that
there is a significant jump in licensing rates for eligible firms, but no change for non-eligible
firms. Moreover, the jump is observed only for firms born about the time of the introduction
of SIMPLES. Then, the validity of AFTER × ELIG as an IV for d crucially depends on
taking firms that were born just after and before than t¯, i.e. |ti − t¯| <  for  small enough.
The regression discontinuity literature (see Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw, 2001;
van der Klaauw, 2002) argues that a local estimate of treatment impact can be obtained by
giving heavier weights to observations arbitrarily close to a discontinuity. If, conditional on a
set of exogenous covariates, we assume very similar distributions of unobservable characteris-
tics of firms born immediately before and after SIMPLES implementation, the discontinuity
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that the introduction of SIMPLES introduces in the factors determining formality can be
exploited to provide unbiased estimates of the local average treatment effect of the program.
Using this argument, Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2010) show that the regres-
sion coefficient of AFTER×ELIG is dependent on the weighting scheme. The econometric
results in Section 6 (see figures 4 and 5) show that only on a small interval SIMPLES had
an effect on licensing rates. Following these authors we will implement a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design, where on a small enough interval about the introduction of SIMPLES,
identification can be achieved by comparing firms born just before and just after the SIM-
PLES introduction.
To summarize, our identification strategy allow us to estimate β1 for firms with θ ∈ (θ¯′, θ¯]
and born near the introduction of SIMPLES, i.e. |ti− t¯| <  for  small enough. This strategy
requires the use of both quantile regression (to model θ) and regression discontinuity designs
(to amplify the effect of SIMPLES at the time of its introduction).
4 Quantile regression discontinuity
In this section we describe the estimator we use to identify the effect of formality on firm per-
formance using an instrumental variables quantile regression approach. Quantile regression
will be an essential tool for identification of the target group, to analyze the heterogeneity
among the firms, and estimate the effect of formality on firm performance. The estimation
strategy follows Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008) and we will describe briefly the
instrumental variable (IV) strategy to estimate the quantile regression model.
Frolich and Melly (2008) propose a different approach to identify and estimate treatment
effects on the distribution of the outcome variable in the regression discontinuity design.
They propose a nonparametric identification of the quantile treatment effects and show
uniformly consistent of the estimator for the potential outcome distributions and for the
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function-valued effects of the policy. Frandsen (2008) introduces a procedure to nonpara-
metrically estimate local quantile treatment effects in a regression discontinuity design with
binary treatment. However, we follow the literature on analyzing the effects of formality
on firm decision, and opt to use a semi-parametric estimator, that is the linear IV quan-
tile regression proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006) to estimate a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design model. One clear advantage of the used estimator is the ability to con-
trol for exogenous covariates that influence the firm revenues.12 This estimator is similar to
Guiteras (2008) and Pereda-Fernandez (2010). The use of QR-IV in regression discontinuity
design has appeared in Guiteras (2008) motivated by an empirical application to the returns
to compulsory schooling, and Pereda-Fernandez (2010) estimating the effects of class size on
scholastic achievement.
In order to find the threshold values θ¯′ and θ¯ we will consider the single dimensional
conditional quantiles, indexed by τ ∈ (0, 1), of the firm’s revenues, y, in model (6),
Qy(τ |d, x, |ti − t¯| < ) = β1(τ)di + β2(τ)ti + β3(τ)xi. (8)
If we assume that for all θ1 ≤ θ2 there exists 0 < τ1 ≤ τ2 < 1, then this conditional quantile
function can be used to find τ¯ ′ and τ¯ that match θ¯′ and θ¯, respectively. With the proposed
identification we can estimate β1(τ) for 0 < τ¯
′ < τ ≤ τ¯ < 1. This case was discussed
by Chesher (2003) where he argued about “the possibility of identification of a structural
derivative evaluated at some quantile probabilities but not at others”(p.1411).
From (7) we can use z = (AFTER × ELIG) as a valid instruments for d. This identi-
fication condition is discussed in Monteiro and Assunc¸ao (2006) and Fajnzylber, Maloney,
and Montes-Rojas (2010). The instrumental variables quantile regression (IVQR) estimator
method may be viewed as an appropriate quantile regression analog of the two stage least
12There is an emerging literature on quantile regression treatment effects. We refer the reader to Firpo
(2007) and the references therein.
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squares (IVOLS) that makes use of a valid exclusion restriction. More formally, and follow-
ing Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008), from the availability of an IV, z, we consider
estimators defined as:
βˆ1(τ) = argminβ1‖γˆ(β1, τ)‖A, (9)
where γˆ(β1, τ) is obtained from
argminβ2,β3,γ
N∑
i=1
ω(|ti − t¯|)ρτ (yit − β1di − β2ti − β3Xi − γzi) , (10)
with ω(.) a weighting function that is monotonically decreasing in |ti− t¯|, ρτ (.) the τ -quantile
regression check function, ‖x‖A =
√
x′Ax and A is a positive definite matrix.13 Contrary to
least-squares, it does not require two stages.
The asymptotic properties of the estimator are described in Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2006, 2008). In particular asymptotic normality holds,
√
n(βˆ(τ)− β(τ)) d→ N(0, J(τ)−1S(τ)J(τ)−1)′
where β = (β1, β2, β3), J(τ) = E[f(τ)(0|d, t, x, z)(t,X, z)(d, t, x)′] with (τ) = yit − β1di −
β2ti−β3xi−γzi, f(τ)(.) its density function, and S(τ) = (min(τ, τ ′)−ττ ′)E[(d, t, x)(t, x, z)′].
5 Data and descriptive statistics
We employ the Brazilian Survey of the Urban Informal Sector (Pesquisa Economia Infor-
mal Urbana, ECINF) collected in October 1997 (11 months after the introduction of the
SIMPLES) by the Brazilian Statistical Institute (IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia
e Estad´ıstica). This survey is a cross-section representative of all the urban self-employed
and micro-firm owners with at most five paid employees, excluding domestic workers. The
13As discussed in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006), the exact form of A is irrelevant when the model is
exactly identified, but it is desirable to set A equal to the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of γˆ(α(τ), τ)
otherwise.
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stratified sampling design (in two stages) allows studying a population of units which are
rare, heterogeneous and hard to detect in standard household surveys. Geographically, it
covers all of the 26 Brazilian states, as well as the Federal District, and also each of the
10 Metropolitan Areas (Bele´m, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Vito´ria, Rio de
Janeiro, Sa˜o Paulo, Curitiba and Porto Alegre) and the municipality of Goiaˆnia. In each
of its two waves, ECINF interviewed roughly 50,000 households among which it found more
than 40,000 individuals which reported owning a micro-enterprise.
Within the Brazilian micro-entrepreneur sector, the most frequent sectors of activity are
retail trade (26% of micro-firms) and personal services (20%), followed by construction (15%),
technical and professional services (11%) and manufacturing (11%). Respectively 8% and
7% of micro-firms belong to the sectors of hotels and restaurants, and transportation. Most
firms are very small both in terms of revenues and employment: the average and median
monthly revenues of Brazilian micro-firms were $US 1,083 and $US 600, respectively. We find
that 87% of all Brazilian micro-firms have no paid employees, and 79% have no employees or
partners at all, 10% of the surveyed micro-firms have one or two paid employees, and only 3%
have between 3 and 5 paid workers. In those firms with at least one paid employee, roughly
22% of all workers are family members, almost two thirds of paid workers are non-registered
sem carteira assinada and only 35% pay from social security contributions.
The ECINF asks whether respondents started their firms themselves or became owners
at a later date. The survey then collects data on the number of years and months since
respondents respectively started the firm or became owners-partners. We use this information
to construct our time-in-business variable. For firms that were not started by their current
owners, our time-in-business variable reflects the time since the current owner joined in as a
partner, which is not necessarily the actual age of the firm. This problem, however, affects
only 8% of firms (92% of respondents report having started their own firms) and it does not
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appear to have a significant impact on our main conclusions. Given that the IV strategy
relies heavily on the validity of this measure we will also consider separately the subsample
of micro-firms where the firm was started by the current owner.
Different measures of formality for this sample were studied in Fajnzylber, Maloney, and
Montes-Rojas (2010). Our interest lies on firms with a government issued license as our
measure of formality. Only 23.2% of all micro-firms have a license which increases to 31.1%
for micro-firms with at least one paid employee. One of the main challenges in estimating the
impact of formality on firm performance is the possibility that both may be correlated with
the entrepreneurs’ unobserved managerial ability. In particular, those micro-firm owners that
start their business because they have been unable to find other jobs or because their families
have been hit by negative external shocks are arguably less likely to have access to good
business opportunities that would allow them to stay in business and succeed. Arguably,
they are also less likely to incur the costs associated with formalization. Some evidence
appears in the ECINF, which shows that individuals that became entrepreneurs to escape
from unemployment are found less frequently among the owners of firms with operating
licenses (21%) than among those without licenses (32%). Similarly, among licensed formal
enterprise owners there are fewer who report having started up to complement their family’s
income (12% of licensed firms and 21% of non-licensed), and it is more common to find
entrepreneurs that mention independence as the main reason to start their business (28%
vs. 17%). On the other hand, a higher fraction of licensed enterprises have plans to expand
(45 vs. 37% among non-licensed firms) and a lower number intend to abandon their business
to search for salaried jobs (6% among licensed firms compared to 13% for non-licensed ones).
While 70% of all micro-firms and 85% of those firms that did not have a license at the
time of the survey only 1 out of 4 licensed business owners made no attempt at regularizing
at the time of starting up. In contrast, while 78.5% of non-licensed entrepreneurs businesses
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did at least not try to regularize their firm when they began operating. Thus, the decision
of whether to operate formally or informally appears to be made in most cases at the time
of startup. To the extent that the decision to operate informally is based on a rational
cost-benefit analysis, this suggests that for most firms the former exceed the latter. This
could be due either to costly and/or complex registration procedures, to high tax rates, or to
a limited demand among very small businesses for the government services or the expanded
access to markets that are associated with formality at any price. While the data do not
allow us to distinguish among these different two possible explanations, 72% of the firms
that do attempt to register report having no difficulties in the process.
6 Econometric results
First, we follow Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2010) and estimate the first-stage
effect of SIMPLES on licensing rates by estimating eq. (7) by weighted least-squares meth-
ods. Note that the first-stage has no parallel in the QR analysis and it is only done to evaluate
the statistical significance of the instrument. However, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, p.
504) comment that an example of a simple and practical strategy for empirical work is to
construct instruments as an OLS projection of the endogenous variable on the exogenous
instruments and covariates (and possibly their powers). As additional control variables we
use the AFTER, ELIG, gender (dummy for female), age and education of the entrepreneur
(the latter as categorical dummies, base category: no formal education), number of members
in the household, a set of dummy variables for the reasons to become an entrepreneur, time
in business (interacted with AFTER and as a square polynomial), and dummy variables
by industry and state. We use a weighting scheme based on ω(w|ti − t¯|) = f(0, w|ti − t¯|),
where f(0, σ) is the normal density of a standard Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and
standard deviation σ. Figures 4 and 5 compute the coefficient estimate of AFTER×ELIG
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for w ∈ {.5, 1, 1.5, ..., 5} (using the same set of controls described in the last paragraph). The
figures show that the effect of SIMPLES is localized at the time of its introduction, and that
this effect is monotonically decreasing in w. Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2010)
show that a value of w = 1 is optimal in the sense that it has the largest significant impact.
The main analysis for our purposes is the estimation of eq. (10), that is, the conditional
quantiles of the model in eq. (6). Here we use revenues as our dependent variable because
both labor and capital stock are endogenous variables. Then, we concentrate on the effect
of formality on revenues, although this effect may be obtained through several channels
(hiring workers, increasing capital stock). In order to implement this we follow the strategy
described in Section 3 where AFTER × ELIG is used as an instrument for d, having a
license. We increase the power of the instrument by interacting it with gender and age of
the entrepreneur and use a weighting scheme based on ω(|ti − t¯|), i.e. w = 1.
Tables 1 and 2 present the IVOLS and IVQR estimates of the conditional mean and
quantiles (selected quantiles) of firm revenues for the selected weighting scheme described
above for all and for those entrepreneurs that started as owners, respectively. Figures 6
and 7 summarizes the effect of licensing on firm revenues. The IVOLS point estimate is
3.40 (std.err. 1.04) for all firms and 3.23 (std.err. 0.97) for the other subsample. However,
given the wide 95% confidence intervals the point estimate is rather imprecise but shows
that formality has a positive effect on revenues. Note that the subsample of firms whose
current entrepreneur was the original owner has higher standard errors. These high and
rather imprecise estimates are similar to those in Monteiro and Assunc¸ao (2006); Fajnzylber,
Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2010).
To examine the heterogeneity associated with the IVQR estimes we perform diagnosis
tests using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.14 First, we test the hypothesis of a zero constant
14Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in QR are discussed in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006) and Koenker (2005).
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coefficient for the IVQR estimates across quantiles, that is, we test the hypothesis that H0 :
β1(τ) = 0. In order to implement the test, we estimate the model for τ ∈ [0.1, 0.9], compute
the Wald statistic for each particular quantile and take the maximum over the corresponding
quantiles. The results for the statistic of tests are 27.83 and 21.74 for the all micro-firms
and owners samples, respectively. These results strongly reject the null hypothesis at the
1% level of significance (the critical values are: 12.69 at 1% level of significance, 9.31 at 5%
level of significance, and 7.63 at 10% level of significance). Thus, there exists strong evidence
to reject the hypothesis of no impact of the SIMPLES on revenue. Secondly, we test the
hypothesis of a constant given effect of SIMPLES on revenues, that is, H0 : β1(τ) = β¯, where
we set β¯ as the IVOLS estimate. The results for the statistic of tests are 9.43 and 6.53 for
all micro-firm and owners samples respectively, such that we reject the null at 5% level of
significance for the first case. Thus, although the confidence interval of the IVQR contains
the point estimate of IVOLS, for various intermediate quantiles, the evidence suggests that
the effect of SIMPLES on revenues is heterogeneous. However, in the second sample the wide
confidence intervals made the IVOLS estimate to remain inside the bands and we cannot
reject the null hypothesis.
The IVQR estimates show that the effect of licensing is not statistically significant for
τ < 0.10 and τ > 0.60 (τ > 0.50 for the sample of original owners). This suggest that, in
terms of the characterization proposed in the Introduction, θ¯′ = 0.10 and that therefore,
10% of the sample corresponds to the entrepreneurs that did not benefit from SIMPLES
because they opted out of formality even after the tax reduction. Moreover θ¯ = 0.50(0.60),
and then the upper 50% (40%) of the sample were already considering that the cost of
formality was not very high. For these segments, we cannot identify the effect of formality
through the introduction of SIMPLES. Taking the complement of those groups, we define
the target population given by 0.10 ≤ τ ≤ 0.50 or 0.10 ≤ τ ≤ 0.60 depending on the sample.
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Note that for this group the effect is roughly similar to the IVOLS estimate. However, we
observe that the effect is actually decreasing on τ for this range. This may suggest that the
effect of formality is not constant across firms, even within the target group. In particular,
those with lower θ benefit more from formality. These may potentially be due to the non-
convexities described in McKenzie and Woodruff (2006), where the return to capital is higher
for low-capital firms.
The study of the covariate effects is of independent interest too. The negative coefficient
of Female reflects the fact that women engage in less profitable activities, possibly due to
household commitments or outright gender discrimination. There is no clear pattern across
quantiles, which determines that gender effect applies uniformly to all types of firms. Inter-
estingly, education is non-monotonic for the conditional mean model and for low quantiles.
In those cases, incomplete secondary education has the highest effect in both subsamples.
However, education becomes monotonically increasing for τ ≥ 0.5. This determines that for
firms in the low conditional quantiles, higher education is not necessarily associated with
higher revenues, but it is with outstanding firms. Finally, the reasons to become entrepreneur
show interesting variability across quantiles. reasons such as “Accumulated experience”, “Be
independent”, “Make a good deal” and “Profitable business” which may be associated with
entrepreneurs with high ability are larger for high quantiles, while reasons for involuntary
entrepreneurs (such as “To help family income”) are larger for the low quantiles.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes to use a quantile regression discontinuity estimator to identify the effect
of formality on firm performance. It achieves several goals. First, it is shown that identifi-
cation of the parameters of interest works for some quantiles for not others. The set where
identification works defines the group of firms benefited by SIMPLES. Second, it applies
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the quantile regression discontinuity design using the instrumental variables framework. We
implement a weighting strategy (used in the least-squares literature) that amplifies the obser-
vations about the time of the introduction of SIMPLES. Third, it provides empirical evidence
that tax reduction and simplification schemes have a significant impact on the micro-firm
sector.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
An entrepreneur with ability θi ≤ θ∗ always finds optimal to be informal. An entrepreneur
with ability θi > θ
∗ finds optimal to become formal if and only if piFi ≥ piIi . Plugging the
first order conditions into (1) we obtain that
piI(θ∗) = (1− α− β)θ∗ 11−α−β (α
r
)
α
1−α−β (
β
w
)
β
1−α−β
and
piF (θi) = (1− α− β)((1− φ)θi)
1
1−α−β (
α
r
)
α
1−α−β (
β
w
)
β
1−α−β .
An entrepreneur with ability θi > θ
∗ who decides to be informal will choose capital k∗
and labor lI(k∗, θi) = (βθ
ik∗α
w
)
1
1−β . Defining γi ≡ θi/θ∗ − 1 we can re-express θi = (1 +
γi)θ
∗ and lI(k∗, θi) = (1 + γi)l∗. Plugging k∗ and lI(k∗, θi) into the expression for the
profit of a formal entrepreneur we obtain that piI(θi) = (1 + γi)
1
1−β (1 − α/(1 + γi)
1
1−β −
β)θ∗
1
1−α−β (α
r
)
α
1−α−β ( β
w
)
β
1−α−β .
Therefore we obtain that piI(θi) > pi
F (θi) if and only if
(1+γi)
α
(1+β)(1−α−β)
1−α/(1+γi)
1
1−β −β
< 1
(1−α−β)(1−φ)
1
1−α−β
.
The left hand side
(1 + γi)
α
(1+β)(1−α−β)
1− α/(1 + γi)
1
1−β − β
(11)
of the inequality above increases in γi as the derivative of (13) d(·)/dγi =
(
α(1−x)
(1−α−β)x
α
(1−β)(1−α−β)−1
)
/D2,
where D ≡ denominator of (13), x ≡ (1 + γ)− 11−β and 0 < x < 1.
Define γ¯ such that the condition above is satisfied with equality. This condition identifies
a threshold level of ability θ¯ = (1 + γ¯)θ∗ such that an entrepreneur i decides to become
formal if and only if θi > θ¯.
Notice that the right hand side of the inequality increases in φ therefore γ¯ and θ¯ increase
in φ. QED
29
Proof of proposition 2
The second cross-derivative d
2piF (·)
dθdφ
is negative. Therefore the difference (piF (φ′)−piF (φ)),
where φ′ < φ, increases in θ. This proves the proposition for formal entrepreneurs. piF (φ′)
increases in θ at a faster rate than piF (φ) as d
2piF (·)
(dθ)2
is decreasing in φ. The result of proposition
1 (single crossing between piF and piI) implies that piF (φ) increases at a faster rate than piI
for θ < θ¯. Therefore it must be the case that (piF (φ′) increases at a faster rate than piI for
θ ∈ [θ¯′, θ¯], where θ¯′ is the new cut-off level of ability given φ′. Therefore this proves the
proposition also for those entrepreneurs that change their status from informal to formal as
a result of the policy change. QED
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: Ad-valorem tax. Profit functions: informal (thick line), formal (thin line), formal
after decrease in tax (dash line)
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Figure 2: Lump-sum tax. Profit functions: informal (thick line), formal (thin line), formal
after decrease in tax (dash line)
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Figure 3: First stage, all micro-firms
All firms
Started as owners
Figure 4: First stage, all micro-firms
33
Figure 5: First stage, started firm as owner
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Figure 6: Quantile regression, all micro-firms
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Figure 7: Quantile regression, started firm as owner
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Table 1: Quantile Regression Discontinuity Analysis - All micro-firms
IV Least-squares IV Quantile regression
regression τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
License 3.40*** 2.03* 3.48*** 1.90*** 4.92 2.60
(1.04) (1.09) (0.66) (0.49) (6.93) (4.15)
Female -0.546*** -0.676*** -0.292 -0.587*** -0.474*** -0.538***
(0.075) (0.162) (0.200) (0.100) (0.111) (0.120)
Age 0.0039** -0.0021 0.021 0.016*** 0.018 0.030**
(0.020) (0.0059) (0.006) (0.004) (0.015) (0.14)
Education categories (base: no formal education)
Primary inc 0.334*** 0.195 0.425 0.672*** 0.988** 1.24***
(0.090) (0.253) (0.296) (0.136) (0.414) (0.16)
Primary comp 0.411*** 0.135 0.555* 0.918* 1.19** 1.52***
(0.119) (0.388) (0.329) (0.49) (0.47) (0.37)
Secondary inc 0.735 *** 0.562** 1.15*** 1.16*** 1.37*** 1.66***
(0.111) (0.313) (0.36) (0.16) (0.46) (0.21)
Secondary comp 0.591*** 0.632** 0.633* 1.21*** 1.39** 1.90***
(0.196) (0.306) (0.351) (0.17) (0.58) (0.23)
College inc 0.573* 0.717 0.764* 1.41*** 1.75*** 2.08***
(0.301) (0.492) (0.455) (0.47) (0.57) (0.50)
Reasons to become entrepreneur (base: Did not find a job)
Profitable business 0.402* 0.968** -0.103 0.513 1.136** 1.64**
(0.287) (0.441) (0.614) (0.441) (0.454) (0.65)
Flexible hours 0.227* -0.022 0.397 0.127 0.369 0.476
(0.132) (0.338) (0.496) (0.184) (0.386) (0.445)
Be independent 0.127 0.350 0.048 0.409*** 0.390** 0.472
(0.165) (0.286) (0.268) (0.118) (0.165) (0.322)
Family tradition -0.230 -0.526 0.030 0.494** 0.334 0.689
(0.302) (1.225) (0.354) (0.214) (0.427) (1.304)
To help family income -0.204*** -0.469** -0.152 -0.171* -0.023 -0.029
(0.060) (0.211) (0.203) (0.110) (0.120) (0.156)
Accumulated experience 0.330** 0.530** 0.447** 0.422*** 0.407 0.909
(0.151) (0.230) (0.244) (0.158) (0.519) (0.912)
Make good deal 0.090 -0.070 0.061** 0.409** 0.558*** 0.395
(0.136) (0.470) (0.301) (0.153) (0.211) (0.405)
As a secondary job 0.558*** 1.013*** 0.886** 0.380 0.968** 0.768**
(0.178) (0.413) (0.495) (0.338) (0.431) (0.353)
Notes: 6741 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. Instrumental variables: AFTER× ELIG
interacted with gender and age of the entrepreneur. See text for additional details.
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Table 2: Quantile Regression Discontinuity Analysis - Owners
IV Least-squares IV Quantile regression
regression τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
License 3.23*** 4.97*** 3.37*** 1.87** 5.00 2.98
(0.97) (1.61) (0.73) (0.82) (7.53) (2.65)
Female -0.549*** -0.034 -0.317* -0.577*** -0.482*** -0.421***
(0.077) (0.382) (0.176) (0.095) (0.112) (0.135)
Age 0.0043** 0.015 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.019 0.027**
(0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.017) (0.11)
Education categories (base: no formal education)
Primary inc 0.294*** -0.364 0.291 0.606*** 0.968* 1.17***
(0.095) (0.686) (0.258) (0.164) (0.459) (0.20)
Primary comp 0.391*** -0.058 0.480 0.863*** 1.17 1.37***
(0.121) (0.772) (0.293) (0.157) (0.51) (0.32)
Secondary inc 0.718*** 0.307 1.05 1.09*** 1.42*** 1.66***
(0.111) (0.883) (0.30) (0.17) (0.52) (0.24)
Secondary comp 0.553*** -0.014 0.570 1.14*** 1.36** 1.74***
(0.201) (1.054) (0.320) (0.18) (0.64) (0.24)
College inc 0.647** 0.487 0.728 1.52*** 1.88*** 2.04***
(0.278) (1.013) (0.512) (0.45) (0.66) (0.37)
Reasons to become entrepreneur (base: Did not find a job)
Profitable business 0.222 -0.201 -0.106 0.685 0.863 1.71***
(0.300) (0.961) (0.747) (0.690) (0.742) (0.36)
Flexible hours 0.387*** 0.853 0.325 0.177 0.369 0.770
(0.140) (0.690) (0.400) (0.208) (0.366) (0.478)
Be independent 0.182 -0.257 0.089 0.445*** 0.384** 0.367*
(0.146) (0.433) (0.258) (0.120) (0.158) (0.226)
Family tradition 0.172 -0.618 0.189 0.688*** 0.486 1.00**
(0.262) (1.257) (0.342) (0.255) (0.387) (0.496)
To help family income -0.224*** -0.104 -0.208 -0.210** -0.062 -0.063
(0.058) (0.301) (0.205) (0.113) (0.132) (0.174)
Accumulated experience 0.323** -0.017 0.393* 0.426** 0.395 0.944*
(0.148) (0.675) (0.246) (0.197) (0.555) (0.592)
Make good deal 0.084 -0.452 0.050 0.448** 0.526*** 0.370*
(0.132) (0.437) (0.298) (0.193) (0.203) (0.193)
As a secondary job 0.657*** 1.58*** 1.03*** 0.478 1.00** 0.569**
(0.194) (0.64) (0.337) (0.311) (0.411) (0.228)
Notes: 6300 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. Instrumental variables: AFTER× ELIG
interacted with gender and age of the entrepreneur. See text for additional details.
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